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ould Germany, which accounts for 1% of the world’s population and less than 5% of 
its GDP, actually be responsible for the sorry state of the global economy? The US 
Treasury Department started the chorus at the end of October with a report on 
currency manipulators, which criticised Germany’s current-account surplus. Then the 
European Commission added its voice last month, when it published its scorecard on 
macroeconomic imbalances and called for an in-depth analysis of the German surplus. 
The emphasis on Germany seems much more justified within the context of Europe. But, 
even there, Germany represents less than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP (and less than one-
quarter of output in the EU as a whole). Germany is important, but not dominant. 
This focus on Germany also overlooks the fact that the country represents just the tip of a 
Teutonic iceberg: All northern European countries with a Germanic language are running a 
current-account surplus. Indeed, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway are all 
running surpluses that are larger as a proportion of GDP than Germany’s (see figure below). 
These small countries’ combined annual external surplus is more than $250 billion, slightly 
more than that of Germany alone. Moreover, their surpluses have been more persistent than 
those of Germany, which ten years ago had a current-account deficit, whereas its linguistic 
kin were already running surpluses of a similar size as today. Over the last decade, this 
group of small countries has recorded a cumulative surplus larger than even that of China. 
Are all of these countries guilty of mercantilist policies? Have all of them engaged in 
competitive wage restraint? 
Much of the facile policy advice proffered to correct the German surplus seems misguided 
when one examines the persistent surpluses of this diverse group of countries. Some are also 
in the eurozone (the Netherlands), others have pegged their currency to the euro unilaterally 
(Switzerland), and still others maintain a floating exchange rate (Sweden). 
Within the eurozone, the counterpart to the German surpluses used to be the deficits of the 
peripheral countries (mostly Spain, but also Portugal and Greece). This is no longer the case. 
Today, the counterpart to Germanic excess saving is ‘Anglo-Saxon’ dissaving: All English-
language countries are running current-account deficits (and have been doing so for some 
time). Taking the United States, the United Kingdom and major Commonwealth countries 
together, the sum of the Anglophone current-account deficits amounts to more than $800 
billion, or roughly 60% of the global total of all external deficits. 




It is not surprising that national policy-makers (and media) in Anglo-Saxon countries are 
complaining of the German surplus. But action by Germany alone will have little impact on 
these countries’ fortunes, because their deficits are much larger. 
The key question one should ask is: Who would benefit if Germany started to import more? 
The peripheral eurozone countries account for only about 10% of German imports, compared 
to almost 40% for the other surplus countries in northern Europe. Stronger domestic demand 
in Germany would thus benefit these other surplus countries (with low unemployment) four 
times more than the peripheral countries, where unemployment is so much higher. Other 
countries with a structural surplus, including Russia, China and Japan, would also benefit 
more from higher German imports than would Spain or Greece. 
The discussion of Germany’s surplus thus confuses the issues in two ways. 
First, though the German economy and its surplus loom large in the context of Europe, an 
adjustment by Germany alone would benefit the eurozone periphery rather little. Second, in 
the global context, adjustment by Germany alone would benefit many countries a little, but 
other surplus countries would benefit disproportionally. Adjustment by all of northern 
Europe would have double the impact of any expansion of demand by Germany alone, 
owing to the high degree of integration among the “Teutonic” countries. 
This applies to both the European and global contexts. Coordination within the eurozone (for 
example, through the excessive imbalance procedure, which might now be applied to 
Germany), seems largely insufficient if the aim is to help the peripheral countries. At the 
global level, the Anglophone deficit countries, too, would benefit much more if all of 
northern Europe increased its domestic demand. 
Germany has been an attractive target for external-deficit countries in Europe and beyond. 
But beating up on Germany alone appears to be the wrong way to get results. 
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